Model of Narrative Nowness for Neurocinematic Experiments by Kauttonen, Janne et al.
Model of Narrative Nowness for Neurocinematic
Experiments
Janne Kauttonen1, Mauri Kaipainen2, and Pia Tikka1
1 Department of Film, Television, and Scenography
Aalto University School of Arts, Design and Architecture
00076 AALTO, Finland
janne.kauttonen@aalto.fi, pia.tikka@aalto.fi
2 Department of Media Technology, Södertörn University
Alfred Nobels allee 7, 14189 Huddinge, Sweden
mauri.kaipainen@sh.se
Abstract
Cognitive neurosciences have made significant progress in learning about brain activity in situated
cognition, thanks to adopting stimuli that simulate immersion in naturalistic conditions instead
of isolated artificial stimuli. In particular, the use of films in neuroscientific experiments, a
paradigm often referred to as neurocinematics, has contributed to this success. The use of
cinematic stimuli, however, has also revealed a fundamental shortcoming of neuroimaging studies:
The lack of conceptual and methodological means to handle the viewers’ experience of narrative
events in their temporally extended contexts in the scale of full cinematic narrative, not to
mention life itself. In order to give a conceptual structure to the issue of temporal contexts,
we depart from the neurophenomenological approach to time consciousness by neurobiologist
Francisco Varela, which in turn builds on Husserl’s phenomenology of time. More specifically, we
will discuss the experience of narrative tension, determined by backward-looking conceptualizing
retention, and forward-looking anticipatory protention. Further, this conceptual structure is
built into a preliminary mathematical model, simulating the dynamics of decaying and refreshing
memory traces that aggregates a retentive perspective for each moment of nowness, which in turn
may trigger anticipations for coming events, in terms of Varela and Husserl, protentions. The
present tentative mathematical model is constructed using simple placeholder functions, with the
intention that they would eventually be replaced by models based on empirical observations on
the psychological capabilities that support narrative sensemaking. The final goal is a model that
successfully simulates the way how the memory system maintains narrative tension beyond the
transient nowness window, and thereby allows mappings to observed brain activity with a rich
temporal system of narrative contexts.
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1 Neurocinematics
Naturalistic neurosciences aim at studying human cognitive functions in conditions that
resemble real-life situations. To apply films as the source of life-like stimuli for brain
imaging experiments in particular has been referred to as neurocinematics [11]. From the
methodological point of view, films, despite their apparent complexity, are highly controllable
because every aspect of narrative flow has been designed to accomplish particular effects by
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means of the established cinematographic methods. In turn, the viewers expect the narrative
flow to be structured to guide their attention and anticipation.
Neurocinematic studies have revealed the similarity of brain responses across viewers
when watching the same film [12, 16]. They have also identified distinct brain dynamics in
subjects viewing, for instance, faces of other people or landscapes [12, 27], global or local
movement [3], or aspects of social behavior [23, 28]. Another study seems to suggest that
narrative tension makes a difference. The fMRI experiment by Hasson and colleagues showed
significant intersubjective correlation between the brain responses of viewers of a Hitchcock
film, but this did not hold for those watching a random surveillance video footage [11]. This
indicates that the similarity of brain behavior between viewers is likely due to the way their
attention is trapped, guided, and tricked by the narrative design that is, in our interpretation,
a system of temporal contexts.
Indeed, filmmaking relies on the mastery of manipulating the viewer’s attention in time.
The neuroscientific observations of film-viewing made so far make it compelling to look into
the factors contributing to narrative cognition in the full temporal scope of films, which,
broadly seen, may correspond to the temporal situatedness of humans in life. However, as has
been pointed out, the mere comparison of content annotation of features present at a given
moment with the synchronized brain responses may not alone provide a sufficient basis for
naturalistic neurosciences to understand higher levels of cognitive functions [12, 16]. This will
require new means of taking into account a broader temporal frame of narrative contexts. In
our view, neuroscientific studies that neglect the viewer’s temporal situatedness with respect
to continuous narrative just fall short of meeting the attribute ‘naturalistic’. It is important
to emphasize that we do not count on the possibility of solving the context-dependency on
the level of annotation. Instead we trust on that the contextualization is to a great extent
an idiosyncratic process and dynamically dependent on one’s previous experiences, which,
yet, is to a great extent intersubjectively shared between different people due to the similar
biologically and socio-cultural conditioned situatedness.
2 Time and narration in neurocinematics
Due to the rapid development of data collection and analysis methods recent brain research
has in large part overcome the technical issues related to the massive amounts of brain data
accumulating from long sequences of stimuli, such as films. The so called free-viewing method
allows unconstrained viewing of entire films in fMRI [12, 2]. In such settings, similar to
everyday movie viewing experience, all previous events condition the experience of nowness
and the anticipation of the coming events along the narrative. Consequently, the key question
for neurocinematics is, how to relate the measured brain activation to the viewer’s experience
of making sense of the story.
Annotation of content is the prerequisite of interpreting brain activity against cinematic
content [31]. Several overlapping methods are already in use within distinct fields, e.g. in
automated video analysis, discourse analysis, dramaturgy, psychology, or sociology [4, 41, 30,
40]. This is, however, a broad field of methodological development that falls outside of the
present topic. For our discussion it suffices to assume that meaningful events in the footage
are annotated and time-synchronized so that they can be related with the brain activity that
they evoke.
The point we wish to make is that time-synchronized annotation alone is not enough
to describe the viewer’s consciousness of the narrative sequence through time. We propose
that another layer of representing the narrative is needed to relate it to the brain activity.
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Figure 1 The multi-layered structure of nowness constituted by ‘retention’ and ‘protention’. In
the image, narrative time can be seen to flow horizontally from left to right. Between the dynamical
loops of retention and protention emerges the experience of nowness. The arrows indicate the
experiential ‘knowledge’ constituted by the memory traces of the past (retention) and simultaneous
anticipation of the future (protention). No arrows are marked to the protentional ‘threads’ (red
lines) as this is yet to unfold. Originally drafted to describe the time consciousness as ‘nowness’ in
general, the image is here adapted from Varela (“The Specious Present“, 1999, p. 303) to describe
the experiential moment of ‘narrative nowness’ in particular.
The recent findings of temporal receptive windows in the brain may guide the mapping of
phenomenological, neural and behavioral nowness into narrative structures on different time
scales. For example, a cortical hierarchy related to varying scales of temporal narrative
coherence was detected by Lerner and colleagues in a functional neuroimaging study that
looked at intersubject correlations across people who were engaged in a) ‘backward story’, b)
‘scrambled word’, c) ‘scrambled sentence’, d) ‘scrambled paragraph’, and e) intact ‘forward
story’ [25]. The studies suggest a hierarchy of frequency bands in brain signals, typically
with highest frequencies in the posterior and lowest in the most anterior parts of the brain
[25, 13, 22]. According to Hasson and colleagues, the higher cognitive regions, such as
posterior lateral sulcus, temporal parietal junction, and frontal eye field, responded to
information accumulated over longer durations (∼36s) than, for example, superior temporal
sulcus and precuneus (∼12s) [13]. This leads to the reasoning that perhaps the measured
length of the temporal receptive windows in the brain corresponds to the size and complexity
of spatial receptive fields (e.g., visual cortex) on one hand, and, on the other, to the level
of abstraction of neural representations [13, 15]. The direct implication of these findings
is that temporal situatedness is to be conceived of in terms of multiple layers. In order to
accommodate this, we will first elaborate a preliminary conceptual model of narrative time
to be followed by a more formal mathematical model.
3 Conceptualizing time consciousness
Varela’s neurophenomenological interpretation of Husserl’s views on temporality assumes
moments of nowness embedded in broader temporal contexts in terms of retention and
protention [37, 36, 14]. Retention refers to the temporally backwards-extended present,
consisting of a tail of past events, retained on multiple levels of gradually decaying memory
traces, serving as contexts that determine the interpretation of nowness. Protention, in turn,
refers to the anticipation of the next moment implied by nowness. (Fig. 1) The experience
of narrative tension can be said to consist of both retention and protention dynamics.
In terms of this conceptualization, we propose a dynamic model of narrative nowness
that serves neurocinematic studies beyond the present and ideally allows mappings between
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retention and protention onto observed brain activity. Varela points out three aspects
that are intertwined in the neurophenomenological study of time consciousness: “(1) the
neurobiological basis, (2) the formal descriptive tools mostly derived from nonlinear dynamics,
and (3) the nature of lived temporal experience studied under reduction”1. The proposed
model allows comprehension of nowness as simultaneously passing past with the still reachable
memory of the gradually distancing past (retention), as well as the anticipation of gradually
approaching future events (protention). A spatial metaphor may help to depict the gradually
‘distancing’ or ‘approaching’ nature of the experiential elements of nowness. In James’s terms,
nowness can be said to have a focus, margin, and a fringe [18]. The duration of nowness
can be intuitively defined in terms of the natural limits of ongoing action, e.g., gestures or
actions. This draws from the studies suggesting that cognitive segmentation of narratives into
meaningful sequences and events is seemingly an in-built cognitive mechanism [43, 32]. The
corresponding instrumental notion of protonarrative2 relates to the phenomenological idea of
nowness, referring to the shortest possible meaningful event. For example, the moment when
someone is rejected by another person exemplifies a protonarrative within the duration of a
few seconds. This unit, may serve as a preliminary heuristic for the segmentation of film
content into events, such as discussed by Zacks and colleagues [42], and thereby as a pointer
to the neural phenomena related to the sense of nowness.
Quite obviously, the order of introducing narrative elements constitutes the foundation
of a narrative. What has happened earlier will define the interpretation of every following
moment of nowness. We assume that once introduced, each meaningful event i establishes a
narrative dimension, and everything that takes place after it can be described in relation
to dimension i with reference to the corresponding narrative coordinate dimension xi. The
dimensions altogether define a high-dimensional narrative ontospace [29], the abstract stage
representing all features whose presence can be meaningful in the story. The ontospace
[21] is very high-dimensional altogether, but the perspective, as we define it, limits the
dimensionality of the momentarily significant space (representational space). There is no
need to assume orthogonality of the dimensions.
Further, we assume that the prominences of each of the dimensions altogether constitute
a set of weights, one for each. This set, termed the retentive perspective, determines to
what extent each narrative dimension is taken into account in the experience of nowness
by the viewer, following the spatial conceptualization of Pugliese and colleagues [29]. A
narrative perspective can be conceived of as a vector, with weights assigned to each dimension.
Based on previous research of the memory [5, 33, 20, 39], decay functions (forgetting curves)
can be modeled with power-law (i.e., ∼t−w) and exponential (i.e., ∼e−wt) functions, with
specific decay weights (w > 0) for narrative dimensions. The narrative perspective refers
to automated, predominantly unconscious moment-to-moment prioritizations among the
dimensions set by the individual movie viewer’s memory and attention, determining the
influence of each in the experience at each transient moment. Another factor is the one of
context-refreshing associations induced by the unfolding story, constituting a feedback loop
that regulates the way the retentive memory traces influence the interpretation of nowness.
The experience of nowness, as described above, while being based on the retentive
perspective, is dynamically coupled to some protentive function, triggering anticipation of
1 Varela “The Specious Present“, p. 305.
2 The notion of protonarrative applied in neuroscience by Pia Tikka in 2010; See also Philip Lewin’s
essay "The Ethical Self in the Play of Affect and Voice," at the Conference on After Postmodernism,
University of Chicago, November 14-16, 1997, www.focusing.org/apm_papers/Lewin.html.
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coming events. It is, however, beyond the proposed model to predict what the anticipated
events may be. It may suffice here to assume that anticipations involve the entire cognitive-
perceptual and experiential apparatus, with its evolution-hard-wired elements, such as
emotions, logic inference, as well as learned and culturally assimilated associations.
The implicit assumption behind the model is that among the functional neural networks
that are active at the moment of nowness are those that were also triggered at previous
stages, when particular aspects of the story were originally introduced, thus constituting
the narrative context against which it is now interpreted. This assumption is similar to
Damasio’s idea of somatic markers, where ’marker’ signals “influence the processes of response
to stimuli, at multiple levels of operation, some of which occur overtly (consciously, ’in mind’)
and some of which occur covertly (non-consciously, in a non-minded manner)”[8]. In other
words, narrative nowness involves continuous holistic updating of one’s situatedness that
aims at predictive decision-making related to protentive landscape. The ideal model, for
the time being considered as a conceptual model, should eventually be modified to match
with empirically observed memory and attention functions. Provided a level of validity with
respect to these aspects of psychology, the model should be able to generate predictions for
brain responses to cinematic events embedded in their full narrative contexts.
4 Formal framework of the Narrative Nowness model
We now propose a mathematical framework for the nowness model, which aims to catch
explanatory aspects of time-dependent dynamics of activation, decay and interference of
narrative weights (xi’s). The model is inspired and based on studies on memory and text
processing [1, 38, 19, 5, 33, 26, 39, 17, 34, 24] and the model proposed by Cadez and
colleagues [7, 6], where multiple memory traces were considered. Narrative weights associated
with narrative dimensions are considered mainly as representations of episodic memories with
relatively short durations (up to hours rather than days). Narrative weights are assumed to
evolve continuously in time. We also assume, for the sake of simplicity, that the structure of
the narrative is relatively linear and classical (i.e., exposition, climax, resolution). Let us
assume that there are N real-valued narrative dimensions (xi’s). Weights are assumed to
follow the dynamical equation
dxi(t)
dt
= FDi (t) + FSi (t) +
N∑
j=1
j 6=i
F Ii,j(t) + FPi (t) + εi(t) (1)
where i=1, 2, . . . , N . At each timepoint, the set of weights xi define the narrative perspective.
Real-valued functions are as follows: FD defines the decay, FS defines the activation source,
F I defines the narrative interactions, FP defines the protention mechanism, and ε is the
error. Error function ε covers any model inaccuracies and randomness (noise) and it can be
expected to become significant especially for complex and rich stimuli, such as movies. In the
presence of random noise, the dynamics becomes stochastic. Protentive functions FP contain
high-level abstract cognitive processing of the narrative information and generally have long
temporal memory. We assume that the narrative tension, consisting of the interplay of
retention and protention, is essential for well constructed narratives, where events are related
to each other both in time and between narrative dimensions. Therefore the protention
creates a kind of anticipatory mechanism of the future events.
In general, solutions xi are not expected to be unique with respect to functions F ; there
might be more than one stimulus that produce the same solution. All functions in Eq. (1)
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are assumed to have nonlinear time-dependent forms that - without further approximations -
cannot be reduced into elementary functions. Time-dependency (i.e., non-stationarity) is
important, because narratives develop in time.
We now describe a simplified version of Eq. (1) using linearization and elementary
functions. For each narrative dimension, we assume that there is a set of instantaneous
narrative events at times 0 < Ti(1) < Ti(2) < · · · <∞ with corresponding impulse weights
0 < Ii(k) <∞ for all k = 1, . . . , |Ti|. Impulses can be defined using the delta function δ(t).
After the impulse has occurred, the corresponding weight decreases exponentially with the
decay rate di > 0, which are gradually reduced with a factor ri ∈ (0, 1] after each impulse.
Factor ri simulates the memory reinforcement effect due to repetitions. While power-law
decay may be closer to empirical data (see discussion in Refs. [5, 33, 20]), exponential function
is easier to implement due to linear derivative. Narrative dimensions are coupled to each other
linearly with coefficients C ∈ <N×N , where negative (positive) values indicate reinforcement
(interference) between two narrative pairs. Interference increases the decay rate, which leads
to faster decrease of the narrative weight. In a simple approximation, the noise term εi
takes a Gaussian form α(t)dB(t), where α(t) ≥ 0 and dB(t) is the Wiener process with
B(t+4t)−B(t)∼√4tN (0, 1) [35]. As the noise should activate only after the first impulse
(i.e., introduction of the narrative dimension), we set αi(t) := αˆi(t)H(t− Ti(1)), where H
is the Heaviside step function and αˆi(t) is the noise coefficient. The noise is assumed to
be uncorrelated between narrative dimensions. Since the protention functions FPi ’s depend
on the narrative (stimulus), they cannot be simplified. However, depending on the specific
narrative and by choosing the narrative dimensions carefully (e.g., via basis transformations),
it could be possible to separate the dimensions in retention-weighted and protention-weighted
ones. For retention-weighted dimensions, we can assume that the effect of impulses, decay
and interactions overcome the protention effects (e.g., long memory) and set FP≈0. Similarly
for protention weighted dimensions, we may assume that FP dominates the dynamics. With
above assumptions, the time-evolution of retentive weighted xi is given by
dxi(t)
dt
= −xi(t)
d0i r|{k:Ti(k)<t}|i + N∑
j=1
j 6=i
Ci,j(t)xj(t)
+ |Ti|∑
k=1
Ii(t)δ(t−Ti(k))+αi(t)dB(t) (2)
If proper scaling of parameters is used, absorbing boundary conditions xi(t) ∈ [0, 1] can be
used. At minimum, one must define parameters d0i (initial decay rate), impulse timepoints
Ti and interaction matrix C, while the remaining parameters are approximated by other
means. If the protention effects are of interest and/or they cannot be separated, functions
FP must be provided and included in the model. Despite its simplicity, Eq. (2) already
allows complicated non-linear dynamics to emerge. Numerical solutions are straightforward
to compute and one can apply Monte Carlo approach to study the model.
Finally, let us run a numerical simulation to demonstrate Eq. (2) for N=5 with four reten-
tion (i = 1, . . . , 4) and one protention-weighted (i = 5) dimensions with an artificial stimulus
of duration 2h (7200s). For the initial decay rates, we set d0 = [3E−4, 4E−4, 5E−4, 6E−4].
Value ∼4.3E−4 corresponds to the classical result by Herman Ebbinghaus (1885) of forgetting
∼40% in 20min. Matrix C is symmetric with C1,2 = −1E−3, C1,3 = 2E−3, C1,4 = 4E−3
and 2E−3 for the remaining three. Impulse powers are set to I = [1, 0.75, 1, 0.90]. Noise
coefficient αˆ = 1.5E−3 and repeat factor r = 0.80 are set equal for all i = 1, . . . , 4. Impulses
are picked at random with total counts 10, 13, 7 and 12. For the protention-weighted dimen-
sion, we set x5(t) =
∫ t
max(0,t−600s) dsx1(s)x2(s)x3(s)/min (t, 600s), i.e., a product function
with 10min memory, from which FP can be computed. Initially at t = 0 all xi are set to
zero. Numerical solution with the time discretization 0.5s is depicted in Fig. 2.
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Figure 2 Numerical solution of equation set (2) with N=5 narrative dimensions and an artificial
2h stimulus. The speculative protention-weighted dimension x5 (green line) depends on retention-
weighted dimensions x1,...,4 (blue lines). Vertical red lines indicate stimulus impulses.
5 Discussion
So far, naturalistic neuroscientific studies have revealed important relations between the
audiovisual content and the corresponding brain activity across spectators. However, this
has been feasible only within isolated time frames, without relating contextual conditions
constituted by the earlier narrative events and the anticipations they trigger in the viewers’
experience in time scales natural to film viewing, not to mention life itself. We envision that
the narrative nowness model will open new ways for analysing and interpreting the results of
neurocinematic experiments, which assume time consciousness within the duration of entire
movies. In addition, the concept of narrative perspective, associated with nowness, can
in principle accommodate even broader life contexts and other individual determinants of
experience, such as engagement in a film culture, or cross-references between movies. Because
of this complexity, it is meaningless to make more detailed assumptions of the model at this
hypothetical phase.
We acknowledge the similarity between the paradigms of sentence processing and narrative
processing as both require integration and memorization of previous events (i.e., words,
sentences and narrative elements; see [26, 17, 34]). However, the time-scale of sentence
processing is much shorter (seconds), which is not enough to generate long-duration dynamics
required by protention mechanism. Existing computational models in linguistics are typically
discrete (see, e.g., [10, 9, 24]) rather than occurring in continuous time domain. There is a
need for a model that allows studying narrative comprehension closer to the signal processing
perspective.
A mathematical framework for a nowness model was presented (Eq. (1)) with a simplified
version (Eq. (2)) allowing numerical experiments. This model accommodates a number of
aspects that are assumed to be relevant in narrative comprehension, such as increasing,
decreasing and interacting of narrative weights. Although it is generally impossible to
reduce high-level cognitive processes into few equations, the model is (another) step towards
understanding narratives via computational methods.
We are fully aware that the experimental verification of the proposed model is a significant
challenge at this stage, since it is not directly evident which values in the empirical observations
would correspond to narrative weights (xi). With techniques, such as MEG and fMRI, the
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possible information of the weights is expected to be hidden within measured multivariate
signals. These techniques also have limitations of their own, such as long-tailed autocorrelation
in the fMRI’s BOLD signal. On the other hand, behavioral measurements require active
participation of the subjects, which can interfere with the narrative comprehension, especially
when time-dependent data is needed. One must also define the numerical values of narrative
weights, e,g., they might be percentages of correctly remembered details or recall time of
narrative elements. The model does not specify any rules how to define protention functions
(FP ), as these are fundamentally linked to building narratives themselves. However, it might
be easier to solve an inverse problem: Estimate FP ’s while given (protention weighted)
solutions xi. Indeed, it is typically certain protention functions that are targeted when
designing the story arc of the narrative (e.g., tension, fear, arousal), which lead to selection
and timing of individual narrative events and cues.
While the proposed nowness model should be regarded as the broad hypothesis that the
experience of nowness can be modeled and mapped to its neural epiphenomena, drawing
inspiration from the heritage of Husserl and Varela, it may also be seen to imply a new
paradigm of research. The model can contribute to the analysis of time- and context-
dependency of narratives and facilitate bridging the gap between the real-life situations and
restricted neuroimaging conditions on one hand. On the other, it will allow generalisations
from cinematic situations to those of everyday life thus supporting the relevance of neuro-
cinematics to naturalistic neuroscience in general. After all, the issue of time consciousness is
not unique to cinema. All cognitive functions are associated with their temporal situatedness
within the world’s narratives, as reflected by one’s unique experience. The potential of
conducting experiments with narratively significant contexts increases also the value of the
neurocinematic studies for the cinematic arts, and more generally, all narrative arts.
6 Conclusions
The neurocinematic paradigm has revealed the limits of the so called naturalistic neuros-
cience with regard to interpreting brain activity elicited by narrative events embedded in
temporal contexts beyond the immediately present. This points out the need for a method
of interpreting neural activity elicited by events in their broad narrative contexts in the scale
of full-length films. Following Varela and Husserl’s phenomenology of time, we divide the
assumed narrative tension at a particular moment of nowness into the backward and forward
looking components of retention and protention, respectively. We have proposed a prelimin-
ary model of how memory traces of past events in a narrative sequence may dynamically
aggregate a retentive perspective that conditions the experience of each moment of nowness.
The model is purely mathematical, constructed using simple placeholder functions that can
later be replaced by empirically founded functions capable of framing a refined understanding
of how narrative memory traces retain and decay in the memory. Although we postulate
that the experience of nowness in itself implies an anticipation for future events and reserve
it a place, modelling this protentive aspect remains as another challenge beyond the present.
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